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Republican Authority
Mortimer Sellers
The proper jurisdiction of lawful authority has always been a central issue in
Anglo-American jurisprudence. English and American legal institutions both grew
out of a seventeenth-century British culture that valued liberty and sought to defend
it legally by carefully defining the scope and purpose of lawful authority. Yet after
1776 the two nations diverged. This paper will evaluate English conceptions of
legal authority from an American perspective. My thesis is that English lawyers
discuss the authority of law in language developed to counter seventeenth- and eighteenth-century European revolutionary thought. British reactions to the English,
American and French Republics preserved Hobbesian conceptions of legal authority
that still influence common-law jurisprudence today, and mislead English-speaking
lawyers who have adopted British terminology. I will suggest a more precise vocabulary, and use it to criticise certain positivist conceptions of the authority of law.
My interest here is in the authority of law, which is to say when (and whether)
citizens ought to obey, apply or respect the laws. I will argue that some
governments' should and do have absolute authority to make and enforce whatever
laws and decisions they determine to be most effective in finding truth and encouraging right action. Nevertheless, citizens may retain the right (or even have a duty)
sometimes to resist or disobey the government's determinations. This is the paradox
of what I shall call "republican authority": the government's right to rule does not
entail a citizen's duty to obey.'
Notice my two separate but related inquiries: first, what does (and should) the
word "authority" mean in a legal context; and second, what connection does (and
should) political authority have with law? Both questions mirror the central concerns of English legal positivism, as established by John Austin on foundations
laid by Thomas Hobbes, and elegantly elaborated by H.L.A. Hart and Joseph Raz.
I shall evaluate English legal (largely positivist) attitudes towards authority from
what I will call a "republican" (which is to say, in my case, also an American) perspective and argue that positivist vocabulary serves an anachronistic social vision
I would like to thank Thomas Kennedy for his research assistance and the National Endowment for the
Humanities for its generous financial support of this project.
1. Most scholars now presume republican government requires representative dcmocney. Se. e.g.. Sellers.
"Republican Impartiality" (1991) 11 Oxford J.of Legal Studies 273; Publius (James Madisoni. The
FederalistNo. 10 (1787) in J.E. Cooke, ed., The Federalist tMiddletown. Conm.: Wesle)an University
Press, 1961) 62. Cf. ifra,note 6. This presumption is not part of my argument for republican authority.
2. People often assume that rights imply duties, e.g. Richard BrandtEthicalThoay(Englevi @cd Cliffs.
N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, 1959) at 438; but rights need not, sometimes should not, and often do not imply
duties in a just legal system. W.N. Hohfeld, "Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning" (1913) 23 Yale LJ.16 at 28-45. Cf. Robert Ladenson. "In Defense of a Hobbesian
Conception of Law" (1980) 9 Phil. & Pub. Affairs 134 at 137-39.
3. The early history and origins of American republicanism have a vast recent bibliography. See. e.g..
Caroline Robbins, The Eighteenth-CenturyConmnomntealthrnan(Cambridge Mass. Harvard University
Press, 1961); Bernard Ballyn, The IdeologicalOriginsof the Ameriean Revohuion (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1967); Gordon S. wood, The Creationof the .AmnreanRepublc. 17761787 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969); J.G.A. Pocock. The .1anavmellian
Moment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975); Isaac Kramnick. RepublicanismandBourqeois
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that never thrived in America, and does not apply anywhere today, even in Britain.
History explains the positivist conception of legal authority, but does not justify
it. My hope is that greater precision in language will lead to a better understanding
of lawful authority, including the authority of law.'
I. AUTHORITY
To discuss authority one must first define it. I will use the word in four senses.
First, someone may be "an authority", which is to say be recognized as an expert
on a certain subject. I shall call this "advisory authority". People turn to advisory
authorities for advice within specific areas of expertise, as when I ask my physician
for medical advice, or consult an architect before building. Second, someone may
be "in a position of authority", which is to say be in a position to command people
to do things. I shall call this "peremptory authority". Peremptory authorities often
obtain their positions through the "authorization" of a higher authority, as when
a governor is given a province. Those "in authority" expect obedience, whether
or not they receive or deserve it. Third, someone may have the moral warrant to
exercise peremptory authority. I shall call this "legitimate authority". Legitimate
authorities have the right and obligation to coerce the obedience of those subject
to them whenever (within the scope of their authority) they determine it to be appropriate to do so. Finally, there may be authorities on authority, as I will explain next.
I shall call these "republican authorities". Republican authorities determine the legitimate scope of peremptory and advisory authority. Republics have republican
authority over their citizens.
II. THE REPUBLIC
By republic, I mean whatever form of government best enables citizens and public officials to find and do the right thing.' To be a republic, a state must be a legitimate authority on authority. Republics rightly determine whose advisory authority
Radicalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990). American lawyers have been interested in the
Constitutional requirements of republican government, which is guaranteed to every state in the union
by Article IV, Section 4 of the United States Constitution. Blackstone, infra, note 46 at IV.4. Cf., e.g.,
William Wiecek, The GuaranteeClause of the U.S. Constitution(Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1972); Cass Sunstein, "Interest Groups in American Public Law" (1985) 38 Stanford L. R. 29; Suzanna
Sherry, "Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication" (1986) 72 Virginia L.
R. 543; Frank Michelman, "Law's Republic" (1988) 97 Yale L. J. 1493.
4. By advocating precision in the language of jurisprudence, I do not mean to imply that precision is always
possible or desirable in the law. One great weakness in Anglo-American jurisprudence has been an
excessive desire for "clarity", even at the expense of justice. See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, "Positivism and
the Separation of Law and Morals", in H.L.A. Hart, Essays in Jurisprudenceand Philosophyk (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1983) 49. Common-law judges often seek to legislate as to future disputes
while deciding cases in the interstices of existing positive law. Hart, "American Jurisprudence Through
English Eyes" in ibid. 123 at 128. This limits the discretion of subsequent decision-makers, which
may not always be desirable. The law may become too precise to be just. Some truths may not be
expressible as rules.
5. On republics in this sense, see Sellers, supra, note 1: Algernon Sidney, Discourses Concerning
Government (London: J. Toland, 1698); Cicero, De Re Publica.The Greek "noXteWt" has a somewhat
different meaning.
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should be followed (or not), whose peremptory authority should be enforced (or
not), and most importantly, when anyone has legitimate authority over anyone else.
The essential measure and justification of purportedly republican governments is
their efficacy in determining and establishing the proper scope of legitimate authority. Sometimes individuals or officials will retain full legitimate authority over their
own actions and decisions, sometimes the law or its agents will advise citizens what
to do, or even tell or make them do what is right. The states which do this best are
republics, and have the right to exercise republican authority over their citizens.
To constitute republican authority, a state must not only seek to serve and realize
justice and the common good, but actually succeed in doing so, or do so better than
any available alternative regime."
M. HOBBES
This brings us back to the English legal tradition, which developed largely in
reaction to "republican" ways of thinking. The root of legal positivism lies in
Thomas Hobbes' antipathy to traditional republicanism, and specifically to the
English republican experiment of 1642-1653." Hobbes challenged the existence
of objective "justice" or a "common good", asserting that "whatsoever is the object
of any man's Appetite or Desire; that is it, which he for his part calleth Good: And
the object of his Hate, and Aversion, Evill.... For these words of Good, Evill, and

Contemptible, are ever used with relation to the person that useth them: There being
nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common Rule of Good and Evill." From
this it follows that in the absence of some "Soveraigne authority" nothing can be
unjust. "Right and Wrong, Justice and Injustice [will] have...no place. Where there
is no common Power, there is no Law: Where no Law, no Injustice." The only
6. "Respublica est res populi. Populus autem non omnis cactus multitudims. sed coctus juri s conscnsu.

et utilitatis communione sociatus." Marcus Tullius Cicero. I de re Publica xxv. 39. as paraphrased by
John Adams, Defence of the Constitutions of the United States. vol. I (London: C.Dilly. 1787) at xxi.
The word "republic" can apply to any form of government that serves justice and the common good:
"Republica res est populi, cum bene ac juste geritur, sive ab uno rege, sire a paucis optinutibus. sive
ab universo populo." Cicero, ibid.. (Frag.) as quoted by Adams, ibid.at xxi. Cf. Thomas Paine. "The
Rights of Man" (1792) in LD. Conway, ed., The Writings of Thomas Paine.voL I INev York: A.M.S.
Press, 1967) at 421-22: "What is called a republicis not any particular form of govemnt. It is u holly
characteristical of the purport, matter or object for which government ought to be instituted, and on
which it isemployed, Res-publica, the public affairs, or the public good....Every govenment that does
not act on the principle of a Republic, or in other words, that does not make the res.p:bhea its %hole
or sole object, is not good govemmenL..[Republican government) is not necessarily connected with
any particular form but it most naturally associates with the representative form [of govemnentl."
Cf. Austin, infra, note 50 at VI.225, note 19.
7. "In these westeme parts of the world, we are made to receive our opinions concerning the Institution.
and Rights of Common-wealths, from Aristotle, Cicero. and other men. Greeks and Romanes_.and
other Writers have grounded their Civill doctrine, on the opinions of the Romans.... And by reading
of these Greek, and Latine Authors, men from their childhood have gotten a habit (under a false shew
of Liberty,) of favouring tumults, and of licentious controlling the actions of their Soveraigns; and
again of controlling those controllers, with the effusion of so much blood; as I think I may truly say,
there was never anything so deerly bought, as these Western parts have bought the learning of the Greek
and Latine tongues." Thomas Hobbes, Leriathan(London: A. Crooke, 165 1) bk. 11,c. XX at 11 0ll.
8. Ibid. bk. I, c. VI at 24.
9. Ibid. bk. I, c. XIII at 63.
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universal evil is anarchy, and only the sovereign can conquer it. 0 Those who accept
the benefits of sovereignty thereby accede to its authority: "it followes, that whatsoever [the sovereign] doth, it can be no injury to any of his Subjects; nor ought
he be by any of them accused of Injustice. For he that doth any thing by authority
from another, doth therein no injury to him by whose authority he acteth."" Hobbes
added that "This great Authority [is] Indivisible, and inseparably annexed to the
Soveraignty."' 2
If Hobbes was right, what I have called "peremptory authority" constitutes the
essential authority of law. Hobbes insisted that "Law ...is not Counsell, but
Command; nor a Command of any man to any man; but only of him, whose
Command is addressed to one formerly obliged to obey him."'3 Hobbes would have
added (if he accepted my terminology) that the sovereign's authority is also legitimate and republican because it prevents the war of all against all. Hobbes even
used the English translation of republic ("commonwealth") to describe the monarchy he advocated. He acknowledged a monarch's duty to protect "his" subjects,
but insisted that the sole legitimate earthly judge of a monarch's behavior was the
monarch himself. 5 To fulfil their moral obligations under law, subjects had only
6
to discern the peremptory commands of the sovereign, and obey them.
IV. PEREMPTORY AUTHORITY
"Peremptory authority" is the authority someone "in a position of authority"
has to command or coerce people to do things. Peremptory authorities expect to
be obeyed, and often are (or must be) obeyed to be considered authorities at all.
Peremptory authorities are in a good position to enforce the civilities of everyday
life, and to solve problems of social coordination. This may justify a peremptory
authority's directives for certain purposes even if the authority itself is otherwise
illegitimate. 7
Hobbes' discussion of legal authority implies that the sovereign authority is indivisible.'" But there is no reason why obedience to the state when it is socially useful
10. "[I]f the essentiall Rights of Soveraignty...be taken away, the Common-wealth is thereby dissolved,
and every man retumeth into the condition and calamity of a warre with every other man, (which is
the greatest evill that can happen in this life)". Ibid. bk. II, c. XXX at 175.
11. Ibid. bk. II, c. XVII at 90.
12. Ibid. bk. II, c. XVIn at 93.
13. Ibid. bk, II, c. XXVI at 137.
14. Cf. supra, note 10.
15. "The Office of the Soveraign, (be it a Monarch, or an Assembly,) consisteth in the end, for which he
was trusted with the Soveraign Power, namely the procuration of the safety of the people; to which
he is obliged by the Law of Nature, and to render an account thereof to God, the Author of that Law,
and to none but him." Ibid. bk. II, c. XXX at 175.
16. "CIVILL LAW, Is to every Subject, those Rules, which the Common-wealth hath Commanded hint,
by Word, Writing, or other sufficient Sign of the Will, to make use offor the Distinctionof Right, atnd
Wrong; that is to say,of what is contrary,and what is not contraryto the Rule." Ibid. bk. II, c. XXVI
at 137.
17. Ladenson, supra,note 2 at 142-45.
18. "There is a Sixth doctrine, plainly, and directly against the essence of a Common-wealth; and 'tis this,
That the Soveraign Power may be divided. For what is it to divide the Power of a Common-wealth,
but to Dissolve it; for Powers divided mutually destroy each other." Hobbes, supra, note 7, bk. II, c.
XXIX at 170.
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should entail an obligation to obey the state in everything. Few today would accept
Hobbes' assertion that absolute obedience to a monarch or parliament is our only
alternative to chaos. The world has seen enough republics and balanced constitutional governments to accept that divided sovereignty may sometimes avoid disaster. Hobbes' English heirs have met this two-fold reality by accepting both the
possibility that sovereigns may be wrong, and the legitimacy of selective disobedience. These concessions allow two other elements of Hobbes' argument to linger
on: his separation of law from morality and the command theory of the law.
Positivists who admit that the sovereign may be wrong continue to maintain
that "the existence and content of the law [is] a matter of social fact whose connection with moral or any other values is contingent and precarious.""' One cannot
have laws without identifiable human authorities because "to be capable of being
authoritative a directive or a rule has actually to express its author's view on what
its subject should do." The central assumption here is that law only exists as some
person's peremptory authority, whether or not it deserves to be obeyed. Most
English lawyers, therefore, would consider it improper that judges sometimes
should follow "vague undefined standard[s]" of individual liberty in place of promulgated rules of law, attributable to the will and intention of a specific authority."
Laws that appeal to a judge's personal sense of morality are considered too vague
properly to be considered laws at all. Some American judges have adopted this
English attitude and vocabulary."
V. ADAMS
Specifically American conceptions of law and justice found expression in
America's revolution, and the constitutions of the newly united states. John Adams'
Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States ofAmerica preserves distinctly American conceptions of legal authority as they existed shortly
after the revolution, when Americans developed their constitutions and consolidated
' Adams followed the English republican writer, James
national government?2
Harrington in distinguishing government "according to ancient prudence...whereby
a civil society of men is instituted and preserved upon the foundation of common
interest" from government "according to modem prudence...by which some man,
or some few men, subject a city or a nation, and rule it according to his or their
private interest"-'.
19. Joseph Raz, "Authority, Law and Morality" (1985) 68 The Monist 295 at 295.
20. Ibid. at 304.
21. American courts do "something very different from vQmt conventional legal thought in all countries
conc6ives as the standard judicial function: the impartial application of determinate existing rules of
law in the settlement of disputes." H.L.A. Hart. "American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes" in
Hart supra,note 4 at 125.
22. See, e.g., Justice Black's concurring opinion in Rochin v. Califrna.( 1952)342 U.S. 165 ami his disscu
in Griswold v. Connecticut, (1965) 381 U.S. 479.
23. Adams, supra, note 6, vol. I.
24. Adams, ibid, vol. I at 126, slightly misquoting James Harrington. "The Common%%ealth of Ozena
(1656) in J.G.A. Pocock, ed., The Political Works of James Harringwn (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1977) 155 at 161.
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This remained the fundamental distinction between positivist and republican
conceptions of political authority. Harrington's "ancient prudence" insisted on govemiment by law, for the public good, and ended with "the liberty of Rome". Modem
prudence "began with the arms of Caesar",25 which made laws "according to the
interest of a man"26 and "deformed the whole face of the world with those ill features of government" 2 until the English commonwealth attempted to restore Rome's
old republic. Harrington had challenged Hobbes' reduction of "all manner and matter of government" unto "the public sword",' or an "empire of men and not of
laws".29 Adams and the United States constitutions extended Harrington's republican conception, by insisting that "Justice" and "the general Welfare" become the
basis of all legal authority. 0 They insisted that morality be made an ineradicable
part of the law.
Adams's samples of the "reading and reasoning which produced the American
constitutions" 3' followed "Butler rather than Hobbes", and pictured people as governed by passion, but weak rather than wicked.32 He supposed that when they find
themselves secure in a position of power, humans naturally tend to abuse it.
Dividing power would control the passions. 3 Republican legal theory insisted that
there could be no republic without justice," and that justice required "equal laws
by common consent...for the general interest, or the public good."3
Adams attributed these ideas to three periods of English history. First, "the
Reformation", then "the Interregnum, and indeed the whole interval between 1640
and 1660", and finally "the Revolution of 1688", which added "Sidney, Locke,
Hoadley, Trenchard, Gordon," and other republican writers to "Harrington, Milton,
the Vidiciae contra Tyrannos" and the "most precious relics of antiquity.' '-6 These
English authors refuted modem advocates "of simple monarchy and absolute
power" and especially "Hobbes, a man...unhappy in his temper...[and] detestable
for his principles, [but] equal in genius and learning to any of his contemporaries.""
Hobbes' principles triumphed in England, where "the time is long since passed
when...[writers such as Sidney] were extolled, propagated, or read". The "contempt
of them is as fashionable, as likely to procure places and pensions, and to make
a book sell now, as it was when Mr. Hume" attacked them.3" America's revolution
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

35.
36.
37.
38.

Ibid., vol. Iat 161.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid. vol. I at 165.
Ibid. vol. Iat 161.
United States Constitution,Preamble.
Adams, supra,note 6, vol. I at xviii.
Ibid. vol. I at 129.
Ibid. vol. I at 182; Cf. Publius (J. Madison), FederalistNo. 51 in Cooke, supra, note I at 349.
Ibid. vol. I at xxi-xxii, quoting Cicero, de re Publica (Frag.): "Respublica res est populi; cum bene
ac juste geritur...cum vero...injustus ipse populus, cui nomen usitatum nullum reperio, nisi
ut etiam
ipsum tyrarmum appellem; non jam vitiosa, sed omnino nulla respublica est, quoniam non est res populi,
cum tyrannus earn factiove capessat; nee ipse populus estsi sit injustus, quoniam non est multitudinis
juris consenu, et utilitatis union sociata."
Ibid. vol. I at 123.
Ibid. vol. III at 210-11.
Ibid. vol. HI. at 211.
Ibid. vol. I. at 325-26.
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embraced the old republican conviction that nothing can be law which isn't just,
and that justice is something more than arbitrary power.' Adams concluded, with
Cicero, that a "mind well instructed by the light of nature, will pay obedience,...to
none but such as command, direct, or govern, for its good or benefit."'
The basic premise of early American jurisprudence, which I share, and will
advocate here, was that laws aren't interesting or binding or even really laws at
all (under a good constitution) unless they are also just. Hobbes had sought to discredit this "ancient prudence" about legal authority by insisting that "justice" cannot
exist independent of a sovereign will, and that "law" is merely the sovereign's command. This hierarchical conception of legality gained currency in Britain, but it
cannot support or explain a legal system that seeks to embody morality in the law,
because "every man invested with power is apt to abuse it".' This is why
Americans abandoned Hobbes and the "modem prudence" he advocated. Justice
requires a diversity of perceptions, and "an equilibrium of powers and privileges"'
that a simple Hobbesian hierarchy cannot provide. Laws that seek to be just must
base their validity on something stronger than a simple chain of command.
VI. AUSTIN
The architect of modem England's neo-Hobbesian legal sensibility, John Austin,
wrote in reaction to the European instability that followed the American revolution,
which he viewed much as Hobbes had viewed the chaos of the English Civil Wars.'
Austin sought to prevent the institutions of government from being "ruthlessly tom
apart by the hands of presumptuous incapacity."" Political power belonged in the
hands of men who have "acquire[d] wealth by industry, and whose conduct and
manners are those of gentlemen.""
The Revolution of 1688 had eclipsed Hobbes' arguments in Britain. Even con;ervative lawyers such as William Blackstone accepted that legislation contrary
o natural justice is not law, and is, therefore, invalid.' Blackstone acknowledged
'natural rights, such as...life and liberty" that "no human legislature has power to
tbridge, or destroy"4 7 but worried that "republicans" overestimated their own
39. Ibid. vol. m at 282, quoting Cicero, It. Philippicae28: "Lex nihil est nisi rec-ta. eta numine Deorum
tracta ratio, imperans honesta, prohibens contraria".
40. Ibid. vol. IIL at 365, quoting Cicero.
41. Ibid. vol. L at 131, quoting Montesquieu.
42. Ibid. vol. L at 177.
43. Cf. Jeremy Bentham, the other architect of English legal positivism, and hisAnsierTo Thre Declaration
Of The American Congress (London: 1776), as discussed by H..L.A. Hart, "1776-1976: Law in the
Perspective of Philosophy" in Hart, supra, note 4, 145.
44. John Austin, A Plea ForThe Constitution,3d ed. (London: 1859) at 17.
45. Ibid. at 14.
46. William Blackstone, CommentariesOn The Lmas OfEngland. voL 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1765)
at 42 (Introd., 2); Cf. Ibid. vol. I at 41: "This law of nature being co-eval with mankind, and dictated
by God himself, is of course superior in obligation to any other. It is binding over all the globe in all
countries, and at all times: no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this; and such of them
as are valid derive all their force, and all their authority. mediately or immediately, from this original."
47. Ibid. vol. L at 54 (Introd., 2).
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abilities to make moral judgments contrary to established authority." This worry
blossomed in Austin, and dominated his new jurisprudence.
The eighteenth-century revolutions destroyed Blackstone's old middle position
between "the advocates for slavery on the one hand, and the demagogues of faction
ofh the other". 9 So Austin criticised Blackstone for even mentioning natural justice:
"to say that human laws50 which conflict with the Divine law are not binding...is
to talk stark nonsense".
Yet Austin recognized what Hobbes had denied-the possibility that "incit[ing]
the public to resistance by determinate views of utility may be useful" when the
sovereign abuses power.' This made it impossible for Austin to justify his command theory, as Hobbes had, simply as the best vehicle for expressing a sovereign
will. Austin insisted instead, as a matter offact, that law is what the sovereign says
it is, and that, therefore, law has no necessary connection with morality, precisely
because the sovereign may be wrong.52
Austin accepted "utility" as a measure of justice, but denied that justice should
play a part in determining what is or is not the law. 3 He considered the province
of jurisprudence to be "positive law", i.e., "law, simply and strictly so called: or
law set by political superiors to political inferiors."" Like Hobbes, Austin argued
that "[e]very law or rule (taken with the largest signification which can be given
to the term properly) is a command. Or, rather, laws or rules, properly so called,
are a species of commands."55 But Austin was more specific. Laws are distinguishable from other commands in that a law "obliges generally to acts or forbearances
of a class"56 . Laws, like "other commands... [are said to] proceed from
superiors...[and]to bind or oblige inferiors 57 and "the term superioritysignifies
48. "On the other hand, over-zealous republicans, feeling the absurdity of unlimited passive obedience,
have fancifully (or sometimes factiously) gone over to the other extreme: and, because resistance is
justificable to the person of the prince when the being of the state is endangered, and the public voice
proclaims such resistance necessary, they have therefore allowed to every individual the right of determining this expedience, and of employing private force to resist even private oppression. A doctrine
productive of anarchy, and (in consequence) equally fatal to civil liberty as tyranny itself." Ibid.vol.
I at 244 (Bk. I, c. 7). The legislature "acknowledges no superior upon earth", Ibid.vol. I at 70 (Introd.,
3), and no one should disobey the sovereign authorities unless "the contracts of society are in danger
of dissolution, and the law proves too weak a defence against the violence of fraud or oppression".
Only then can "recourses to first principles" be justified. Ibid.
49. Ibid. vol. I at 243 (bk. I, c. 7).
50. John Austin, The Provinceof JurisprudenceDetermined, ed. by H.L.A. Hart, (New York: Humanities
Press, 1954) at 185 (first published in 1832).
51. Ibid.at 186. Austin used the word "utility" because like Hobbes he believed "moral sense" and "conscience" merely to be "convenient cloaks for ignorance or sinister interest". Ibid.
52. "The existence of law is one thing; its merit or demerit is another. Whether it be or be not is one enquiry;
whether it be or be not conformable to an assumed standard, is a different enquiry. A law, which actually
exists, is a law, though we happen to dislike it, or though it vary from the text, by which we regulate
our approbation and disapprobation." Ibid. at 184.
53. "To prove by pertinent reasons that a law is pernicious is highly useful, because such process may
lead to the abrogation of the pernicious law...But to proclaim generally that all laws which aire pernicious
or contrary to the will of God are void and not to be tolerated, is to preach anarchy, hostile and perilous
as much to wise and benign rule as to stupid and galling tyranny." Ibid. at 186.
54. Ibid. at 9.
55. Ibid. at 13 "A command is distinguished from other significations of desire, not by the style in which
the desire is signified, but by the power and the purpose of the party commanding to inflict an evil
or pain in case the desire be disregarded." Ibid. at 14.
56. Ibid. at 19.
57. Ibid. at 24.

Republican Authority

might: the power of affecting others with evil or pain, and of forcing them, through
fear of that evil, to fashion their conduct to one's wishes.'" S
Thus Austin had no concern "[w]ith the ends or final causes for which governments ought to exist, or with their different degrees of fitness to attain or approach
those ends.... 591His only interest was "positive law...set by a sovereign person, or
a sovereign body of persons, to a member or members of the independent political
society wherein that person or body is sovereign or supreme." Austin insisted that
"the power of a sovereign...is incapable of legal limitation," ' and that "[e]very
supreme government is free from legal restraints", which is to say, "every supreme
' Republicans who distinguish between
government is legally despotic."6
"free" and
"despotic" governments, and assert that rights and duties "ought to be conferred
and imposed for the advancement of the common weal'"' are mere "lovers of
democracy." Their "distinction between free and despotic governments...is
expressed in terms which are extremely inappropriate and absurd, and which tend
to obscure the independence of political or legal obligation, that is common to
sovereign governments of all forms or kinds." '
Austin's jurisprudence sought to protect British institutions from the threatening
political philosophy of the American republics. In asserting that "[elvery legal right
is the creature of a positive law '"6, Austin denied that constitutions and moral principles can or should ever be a part of the lav.1 Thus Austin's position subtly altered
Hobbes' argument. Hobbes had separated law from morality because he preferred
any stable government to anarchy, and supposed that popular or restricted government would lead to anarchy. If only a despot can maintain peace and security then
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid. at 192.
60. Ibid. at 193. "To th[eir] determinate superior, the other members of society are subject. The mutual
relation which subsists between...them, may be styled the relationofsoverekgn and subject". Ibid.at
194. Thus "no government [can be] sovereign and subject at once...[and) no government can be styled
with propriety halfor imperfectly suprene." Ibid. at 241.
61. Ibid. at 254.
62. Ibid. at 27 1.
63. Ibid. at 272.
64. Ibid. at 273.
65. Ibid. at 274. Fear of presumptuous incapacity led Austin to endorse Hobbes' defense of despotism:
"the soveraign power...is as great as men can be imagined to make it. And though of so unlimited a
power men may fancy many evill consequences, yet the consequence of the want of it. shich is %arre
of every man against his neighbour, is much worse. The condition of man in this life shall never be
without inconveniences: but there happeneth in no commonwealth any great inconvenience, but %hat
proceeds from the subjects' disobedience. And %%
hosoever, thinking sovereign pot er too great. %ill
seek to make it lesse, must subject himselfe to a power %%
hich can limit it: that is to say. to a greater."
Hobbes, supra,note 7, bk. IL, c. XX at 106-107. quoted in Austin. supra. note 50 at 275. One opinion
most "repugnant to the nature of a commonwealth, is this: that he %
ho bath the sovereign pover is
subject to the civill lawes....But to the civill lawes, or to the lawes %%
hich the sovereign maketh. the
soveraign is not subject...[Whosoever] setteth the civill lawes above the sovereign. setteth also a judge
above him, and a power to punish him: which is to make a new sovereign; and. again, for the same
reason, a third to punish the second; and so continually without end. to the confusion and dissolution
of the commonwealth." Hobbes, supra, note 7, bk. II.. c. XXIX at 169. quoted in Austin. supra.note
50 at 275-76.
66. Ibid. at 278.
67. "[A]gainst a monarch properly so called, or against a sovereign body in its collegiate and sovereign
capacity, constitutional law is positive morality merely, or is enforced merely by moral sanctions....
Consequently, although an act of the sovereign which violates constitutional la%.may be styled nith
propriety unconstitutional,it is not an infringement of law simply and strictly so called, and cannot
be styled with propriety illegal." Ibid.at 259. Cf. quotation from Austin contained in foon:e 52 above.
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despotism is morally desirable. Viewing law as the morally neutral vehicle of a
sovereign's will would be legitimate if maximizing obedience to the sovereign will
were a good thing. But Austin conceded that monarchs may be wrong.6 That made
his command theory, and the separation of law from morality, questions of scientific
fact. Austin did not argue that law and morality ought to be kept separate, or that
law ought to be the sovereign's command, but that laws are sovereign commands,
and utterly unconnected with morality. I suggest they neither are nor ought to be.
VII. ADVISORY AUTHORITY
One weakness in Austin's argument for an absolute separation between law and
authority is his disregard of what I have called "advisory authority". "Advisory
authority" is the authority "an authority" possesses in her capacity as an expert on
a given subject. One turns to advisory authorities for information one might not
know or recognize, and accepts advice (or not) after exercising one's own judgment.
Thus a physician may advise me of considerations I should contemplate in deciding
whether to undergo a given operation. I apply the information to make my own
decision.
Austin and his English followers overlook advisory authority when they assert
that laws always must be rules "set by men to men" 69 and that there is no point to
authority unless it is binding even when mistaken." Yet Blackstone had rightly
observed the historical truth that common law precedents have not been binding
when judges consider them contrary to reason." As authority common law precedents are often merely advisory, and not determinative either of reason or the actual
common law, although they have weighty authority.' Thus Austin's denigration
of natural law falsified the reality of England's own legal system.
The root of this error is Hobbes's confusion of authority with sovereignty and
power.73 If Hobbes were right that whoever has actual power is sovereign, that the
sovereign has absolute authority, and that all sovereigns ought to be obeyed, then
sovereignty, power, and authority need not be distinguished. But if one recognizes
that power can sometimes be unjustified, or that sovereignty can be divided, or
advisory, then the scope of any "authority" must be justified and the nature of the
authority itself accurately described. Modem positivism concedes the moral limitations of power without yet recognizing that this constrains the way in which
68. Ibid. at 186.
69. Ibid. at 10.
70. Cf. Joseph Raz, "Authority and Justification" (1985) 14 Phil. & Pub. Affairs 3 at 15: "The whole point
and purpose of authorities...is to preempt individual judgment on the merits."
71. Blackstone, supra,note 46, vol. I at 69 (Introd., 3).
72. Which is to say that judges take common law precedents seriously, and are inclined to accept the reasoning of precedents, unless they have a strong reason not to.
73. The mistake originated with Hobbes, who disdained classical learning. See Hobbes, supra, note 7.
The Romans made a clear distinction between auctoritas(authority) which belonged to the best and
wisest men, and potestas (power) or imperium (sovereignty), which belonged to the people, at least
in a republic. Thus D. Brutus: "did well by the republic in defending the authority (auctoritas)of the
Senate and the liberty and sovereignty (imperun) of the Roman people" M. Tullius Cicero, Philippicae,
M, xv at 37. Cf. ibid., IV, iv at 8: "decrevit senatus D. Brutum optime de re publica mereri, cum senatus
auctoritatem populique Romani libertatem imperiumque defenderet."
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authorities can bind. Advisory authority only binds to the extent that its subjects
ought to take its advice. Legitimate authority is only legitimate within the proper
scope of its authority. A policeman who tells you how to vote ought not to be
obeyed.
VIII. RAZ
Joseph Raz has provided the most recent English elaboration of authority's relationship to law.74 Positivists now recognize that law and authority are best justified
when they rightly determine for their subjects what good citizens ought to do, or
at least makes such determinations more accurately than was possible without the
authority's help." Raz perceives that although would-be rulers and legal systems
"may not have legitimate authority...every legal system claims that it possesses
legitimate authority.'" 6 He adds that if "the claim to authority is part of the nature
of law then whatever else the law is it must be capable of possessing authority."
This leads him to two conclusions: first, the old Hobbesian holding that "a directive
can be authoritatively binding only if it is, or is at least presented as, someone's
viexv of how its subjects ought to behave"; and second, "it must be possible to identify the directive as being issued by the alleged authority without relying on reasons
or considerations on which the directive purports to adjudicate." Which is to say,
the moral merits of the question."3 Thus "to be capable of being authoritative a directive or a rule has actually to express its author's view on what its subjects should
do.' ' 9 One "can benefit by [authoritative] decisions only if [onel can establish their
existence and content in ways which do not depend on raising the very same issues
which the authority is there to settle."
Like Hobbes and Austin, Raz does not want the determination of what law is
to involve a judgment on what law ought to be.' He supposes that "the truth or
falsity of legal statements depends on social facts which can be established without
resort to moral argument."' - Hence, "the identification of a rule as a rule of law
consists in attributing it to the relevant person or institution as representing their
decisions and expressing their judgments.... Moral argument can establish what
legal institutions should have said or should have held but not what they did say
or hold.'" This supports the now familiar argument that "[e]very attribution of an
intention to the law is based on an attribution of a real intention to a real person
in authority or exerting influence over authority. " Law exists to "allow those in
74. "English" for the purposes of this paper in virtue of his position. attitude and education, rather than
by birth or inclination.
75. Raz calls this "The Normal Justification Thesis". See Joseph Raz. The orahy ofFree em (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1986) at 53: cf. Raz, supra. note 19 at 299.
76. Raz, supra,note 19 at 300.
77. Ibid.
78. Ibid. at 303.
79. Ibid. at 304.
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid. at 310.
82. Ibid. at315.
83. Ibid. at 315-16.
84. Ibid. at 318.
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authority to express a view on how people should behave, in a way which will make
it binding.""
English academic orthodoxy since Austin has held that law consists in the
sovereign's commands, which do not depend upon morality, and would not be law
if they did.' Yet common law practice and the existence of advisory authorities
vitiate the command theory, which only survived in Austin to reconcile his "scientific" pretensions with a deep-seated scepticism about objective morality. (As
distinguished from individual appetites and pleasures.)' Yet even Austin conceded
that positive law may sometimes be morally wrong. Once one accepts the possibility of moral truth, it follows that some laws will be better than others. Many
English lawyers would now agree that authorities only eam legitimacy when they
help their subjects better to comply with reason.s9 All that survives of Hobbes' old
anti-republican doctrine is the separation of law from morality and an eviscerated
command theory, that canies no moral obligation with it. But all legal systems claim
legitimacy. In seeking to substantiate their claims they must inevitably incorporate
the "sounding and specious frame"' of morality into their legal discourse.
IX. LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY
This brings us to legitimate authority. Authorities that have the moral warrant
to act as they think best are "legitimate authorities" for the areas over which they
deserve jurisdiction. When legitimate authorities exist, they have the right and obligation to coerce the obedience of those subject to them whenever (within the legitimate scope of their authority) they consider it appropriate. Legitimate authorities
usually deserve 9' obedience whenever (within the scope of their jurisdiction) they
tell people what to do. By "scope of legitimate authority" or "jurisdiction" I mean
the area within which that authority has the moral warrant to exercise peremptory
authority-the area within which an authority has the moral right to coerce compliance. Laws are attempts to assert legitimate authority.
English-speaking lawyers have emphasized peremptory authority in their theories of law, to the detriment of a proper understanding of how authorities gain
legitimacy (or sometimes remain merely advisory). Under the influence of positivism, recent discussions of legal authority often treat laws as non-moral orders
or commands. But laws need not command, nor are laws or legal systems invariably
legitimate. In seeking to make their authority legitimate, by trying (or claiming)
85. Ibid. at 321.
86. Some, including Hart, have sought to modify the command theory, while clinging to the old separation
of law from morality. H.L.A. Hart, "Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals" in Hart, supra,
note 4 at 57-62.
87. "And as for the moral sense, innate practical principles, conscience, they are merely convenient cloaks
for ignorance or sinister interest". Austin, supra,note 50 at 186. Cf. supra,note 5 1, and accompanying
text.
88. "The good of mankind, is the aggregate of the pleasures which are respectively enjoyed by the individuals who constitute the human race." Ibid. at 105.
89. Supra, note 75 at 93-94; cf. Blackstone, supra, note 46, vol. I at 70.
90. Austin, supra, note 50 at 186.
91. See infra, notes 105-108, and accompanying text.
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to draft reasonable laws, rulers will necessarily overstep any putative boundary
between law and morality. Laws that try to embody morality cannot be understood
without reference to the morality they claim to realize.
Most states and authorities now claim to have what I have called a "republican"
attitude to law. They claim to rule and to legislate "justly" or "for the common
good" and to have a right to do so. In short, they claim legitimacy. Often governments and legislators sincerely seek to do what is right. Their aim is not to separate
law from morality, but to embody morality in lav.
X. LAW AND MORALITY
Hobbes challenged England's seventeenth-century republicans by insisting that
"good" is nothing but "appetite or desire", but that we all fear anarchy and, therefore, owe the sovereign absolute obedience for preventing it. English republicans,
and their American followers, chose instead to observe "the laws of nature and
of nature's God", including "inalienable rights" which citizens may "alter or abolish"-their governments to preserve. - Once Hobbes' successors conceded the value
of republican efforts to "establish justice" and "promote the general welfare,"' their
other attempts to separate law from morality lost both purpose and justification.
Recognizing that authority is best justified when it rightly determines for its subjects what they ought to do, positivists should now realize that morality's role in
determining the truth or falsity of legal statements is unavoidable. Legal systems
that claim and seek to be morally justified inevitably build moral values into law
to such an extent that unless moral truth itself is a "social fact", social facts alone
are not sufficient to determine the law's content. The law purports to help people
behave as they actually ought to behave, rather than merely make them do what
public officials want. Thus positivists have been wrong to maintain that "every attribution of an intention to the lav is based on an attribution of a real intention to
areal person in authority." Some laws will require citizens or judges to make determinations of moral value which cannot be adequately expressed in positivist
prospective legislation.
I wish to be clear about the way in which those who seek legitimate authority
will inevitably build a moral component into their legislation. Some moral truths
may be simply inexpressible as written or enacted "social facts". Sometimes justice
will be best realized by giving officials or individuals discretion to interpret general
moral precepts themselves. This discretion, expressed in lav by words such as "reasonable" and "adequate", is bound by "social fact" only to the extent that "reasonableness" and "adequacy" are social facts. One pernicious product of positivism
has been the tendency to assume that such expressions have no meaning, and are
not law, until judges make them determinate by deciding (or "legislating") in specific cases.94Viewing judicial decisions as prospective legislation in this way may
92. Declarationby the Representative of the United States of Ajuerwa, in general congress assembled
(Philadelphia, July 4, 17761.
93. Constitutionof the United States Preamble (September 17. 1787).
94. See, e.g., Raz, supra,note 19 at 319; Hart, "American Jurisprudence-. supra. note 3 at 141.
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make the law for subsequent cases more determinate than it ought to be. Legitimate
legal systems will quite often provide or preserve judicial or personal discretion
which has no prospective or legislative effect whatsoever. In a legitimate legal system,wrong decisions do not always change the law.9"
XI. JURISDICTION
So far I have spoken of the law's claim to "legitimate" authority, without specifying when laws are "legitimate". This is because law seldom defers determinations
of legitimacy to its subjects. Most legal systems claim total authority to determine
when their own authority applies. States that make these determinations correctly
are true republics. 6
Contemporary legal positivists, frightened by the implications of their own analysis of sovereignty, have sought to deny the law republican authority, by insisting
that a legal system's authority to determine its own jurisdiction is never legitimate.
Thus, although Joseph Raz maintains the strong positivist thesis that "[tihe whole
point and purpose of authorities...is to pre-empt individual judgment on the merits
of a case, and this will not be achieved if, in order to establish whether the authoritative determination is binding, individuals have to rely on their own judgment
of the merits' '9 , he moderates his absolutist conception of authority by making a
distinction between jurisdictional and other mistakes. "[A]uthorities have limited
powers. Mistakes which they make about factors which determine the limits of
their jurisdiction render their decisions void.... [Only] factors about which the
authority was wrong, and which are not jurisdictional factors, are pre-empted by
the directive."9'
Positivists must deny legal "authorities" any authority over jurisdiction to avoid
the implications of positivism's absolutist conception of authority. If legitimate
authority always deserves obedience, then no one should ever have jurisdictional
authority. No one is always right. This is why contemporary positivists deny general
obligations to obey the law even in a just society." The scope of law's authority,
positivists now argue, "depends on the person over whom authority is supposed
to be exercised: his knowledge, strength of will, his reliability in various aspects
of life"." The "government may have only some of the authority it claims, it may
does following
have more authority over one person than over another. The test is...:
95. See Blackstone, supra, note 71 and accompanying text.
96. See supra, notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
97. Raz argues that "the fact that an authority requires performance of an action is a reasonfor its perforniance which is not to be added to all other relevant reasons when assessing what to do, but should
ercludeand take the place of some ofthen." (italics in original) Raz calls this the Pre-emptive Thesis,
supra,note 75 at 46. This is because "all authoritative directives should be based on reasons which
already independently apply to the subjects of the directives and are relevant to their action in the circumstances covered by the directive." Raz calls this the Dependence Thesis in ibid. at 47-48. "An
authority is justified [i.e., legitimate] ...
ifit is more likely than its subjects to act correctly for the right
reasons." Ibid. at 61.
98. Ibid. at 62. Cf. Raz, supra,note 70 at 26.
99. Raz, supra, note 75 at 70. See also Raz, "The Obligation to Obey, the Law", in Raz, The Authority
of Law' (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979) at 233-49.
100. Raz, supra, note 75 at 73.
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the authority's instructions improve conformity with reason? For every person the
question has to be asked afresh, and for every one it has to be asked in a manner
which admits of various qualifications."' Because of "the bureaucratic necessity
to generalize and disregard distinctions too fine for large-scale enforcement and
administration, some people are able to do better if they refuse to acknowledge
the authority of...law. We are forced to conclude that...[nothing can] justify the
claims to authority which [even just] governments make for themselves."" Positivists have always argued that "a government's power can and normally
does quite properly extend to people who do not accept its authority" ' and that
"[t]here is no way of acting, politically or otherwise, in pursuit of ideals except
by relying on the judgment of some people as to which ideals are valid, and imposing it on others who disagree.""' Many positivists now also accept that "the goal
of all political action [is] to enable individuals to pursue valid conceptions of the
good and to discourage evil or empty ones.""' But to accept this, as most English
lawyers now do, threatens positivism's content-independent concept of authority."
Contemporary positivists struggle to limit authority's jurisdiction, because wide
jurisdiction would threaten the separation of law from morality. Wide jurisdiction
requires too much discretion. The problem, of course, is to rightly determine who
is an advisory authority on what, to allocate peremptory authority justly, and to
restrict the various authorities to their legitimate scope ofjurisdiction. Yet old-fashioned Austinian positivism's hierarchical conception of authority can be reconciled
with the normal justification of authority (as an effective arbiter of truth) if and
only if a viable technique can be found to determine the legitimate scope of everyone's authority. As for any legitimate authority, the proper justification for an
authority on the scope of authority ("republican authority") would be that it is more
likely to get things right than any other person, technique or institution. Republican
authorities deserve to rule because they can determine who is best able to find moral
truth. Veracity legitimates authority.
XII. THE DUTY TO OBEY
America's republican revolutionaries assumed that the people collectively have
republican authority, and that bicameral democracies are the best republics.t " One
need not accept this to recognize that ultimate (Hobbesian) sovereignty should
belong to whoever is best able to distribute authority correctly. The question remains
Ibid. at 74.
Ibid. at 78.
Ibid. at 102.
Ibid. at 158.
Ibid.at 133. Cf. ibid.at 142: "[O]ne does not wish one's desire satisfied ifonc's r-ason for the dzsire
rtimsh merely
is mistaken even if one continues, through ignorance. to entertain the desire. One ds not
not to have mistaken desires; one also does not wish to have them satisfied." See also ibtd at 159:
"While an authority's belief that a decision is based on sound considerations makes it binding even
if it is not in fact sound, the reason for this is that acknmledging the validity of an authont)'s d-cision
even if it is unsound is in fact more likely to lead to action supported by sound reason than any alternative method of deciding what to do."
106. As Joseph Raz recognizes. ibid.at 158.
107. See, e.g., Adams, supra, note 6 passim; "Publius" in Cooke. supra.note I passim.

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Sellers

of whether this republican authority has a right to compel obedience, and whether
citizens have a duty to obey the republic's ordinances and commands, or those of
the dependent peremptory authorities the republic endorses.
One theory of rights suggests that rights necessarily entail duties in others. 0 3
Yet the normal meaning of the word "right" embraces a wide variety of situations
in which there is no correlative obligation whatsoever.'I Sometimes people have
every right to act, while others have every right to oppose them, as when shopkeepers engage in lawful competition." ' So too republican authorities may have
the right (or duty) to compel the obedience of their subjects while certain subjects
have no duty to obey."'
This situation arises when the best available public technique for determining
the right thing to do determines that it is appropriate to compel citizens to follow
a course of action which certain citizens remain absolutely convinced is wrong.
To constitute a "republic", the state must merely provide the best available technique for determining how to find out what is right. This may be fallible. Suppose
the best republics are democracies. Public officials will have a duty to enforce the
determinations of the majority, but citizens who disagree on vital issues may have
a right or even a duty to oppose them if that is the best way to educate the majority
about truth. The republic should apply the republican technique that justified it,
but dissenters may be justified in civil disobedience if they act to promote the republic's own purpose: right action.
Positivism's hierarchical conception of authority has misled its modem proponents into the assertion that a right to rule implies the obligation to obey."' This
is because their command theory of law has led positivists to overlook (1) the
importance of moral truth; (2) the possibility of advisory authority; and (3) the fallibility of legitimate authorities.
XIII. REPUBLICAN AUTHORITY
The republican conception of authority solves many of the problems positivism's
emphasis on peremptory authority created for modem jurisprudence. The ultimate
"republican authority" is whatever person or institution can best determine who
(or what) has legitimate authority in which situations. Republican authority justifies
aspects of positivism by providing an ultimate arbiter of legal validity (like the
Hobbesian sovereign) and so the apex of a hierarchy of legal authority capable of
issuing Austinian commands. But it is important to remember that such commands
must have a moral component to be obligatory, and do not always obligate their
subjects.
E.g., Raz, supra, note 75 at 170.
Cf. Ladenson, supra,note 2 at 137-39.
Hohfeld, supra,note 2 at 36, citing Quinn v. Leathem, [1901] A.C. 495 at 534.
Cf. Ladenson, supra, note 2 at 137-38. Republican authorities have what Ladenson calls a "justificationright". As contrasted with "claim-rights", justification rights imply no obligations.
112. See, e.g., Raz, supra, note 70 at 5. Legal authorities claim "a right to rule, which implies an obligation
to obey....They have legitimate authority only if and to the extent that their claim is justified and they
are owed a duty of obedience." Cf. Raz, supta, note 2 at 26.
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The concept of republican authority corrects English positivism by illustrating
law's inevitable association with morality. Laws only deserve obedience to the
extent that a republican system endorses their legitimate authority. To earn this
endorsement laws must incorporate morality to the greatest (morally appropriate)
extent possible. This requires the use of morally loaded language. For sovereigns
to deserve the right to rule Hobbes and Austin would assign them, they must distribute their authority in ways that positivists have been unable to accept. To rescue
any element of Austin's conception of legal authority, one must abandon his positive
separation of law from morality."'
XIV. CONCLUSION
Modem conceptions of legal authority owe too much to the absolutist errors
of early English positivism, which survive unnoticed throughout ourjurisprudence.
The American legal tradition embraced republicanism very early, which explains
its lingering resistance to the positivist legacy, and to Austin's doctrines of authority.
But even Americans sometimes use his vocabulary, despite its incongruity with
both their legal system and their constitution. I have distinguished four types of
authority to demonstrate that laws and sovereigns do not always deserve or even
expect obedience, and that legal systems lose legitimacy when they try to separate
law from morality. Advisory authorities give advice without demanding obedience;
peremptory authorities often demand obedience without receiving or deserving it;
legitimate authorities have a right to rule, within their appropriate spheres of authority, but need not always be obeyed; and republican authorities determine which
authorities are legitimate. Only republican authorities deserve the mantle of (modified) Hobbesian positive sovereignty, which they earn by being better than the
alternatives. This requires maintaining a republican attitude, and legislating for the
common good, in search of justice. Positivists have been dazzled by authority's
peremptory effects, but the proper source of authority is not power, but veracity.
Law, like all authorities, claims to serve truth. When it doesn't, or doesn't try to,
it loses its authority.

113. Hobbes and Austin's theories of sovereign authority survive in the unchecked poers of the British
parliament, but few contemporary English lawyers share the old fear of democracy H.LA. Hart is
prominent among those who have recognized and advocated substantive legal limitations on thl-exercise
of sovereign power, HI-LA. Hart, The Conceptof Lou' (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1961) at 14450. But Hart, like many other contemporary positivists, continues to assert that %hat the law is can
and should be sharply distinguished from wshat the law ought to be. Hart. supra, note 4 at 57-62.

